Advanced Dynamic Games Module

1. Long Run and Short-Run Players

• Simultaneous Move Games: slides-pdf slides-doc Fudenberg, D., D. M. Kreps and E. Maskin [1990]: "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, 57: 555-573
• Moral Hazard Games: slides-pdf slides-doc Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine. 1994. Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players. Journal of Economic Theory 62, no. 1: 103-135.
  
• Continuous Time Games: slides-pdf slides-doc Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [2007]: "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, 10: 173-192, 

2. The Folk Theorem

• Finite and Infinite Horizon Folk Theorems: slides-pdf slides-doc Abreu, D., P. K. Dutta and L. Smith [1994]: "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition,"Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin [1986]: "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 54: 533-54, Kandori, M. [1992]: "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, 59: 61-80
• Experiments on Repeated Games: slides-pdf slides-doc Pedro Dal Bo [2005]:  Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future, American Economic Review.
• Imperfect Public Information: slides-pdf slides-doc Fudenberg, D., D. K. Levine and E. Maskin [1994]: "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, 62: 997-1039
• Private Information: slides-pdf slides-doc Ely, J. C., J. Horner and W. Olszewski [2003]: "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Northwestern University, Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1991]: "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 54: 26-47,  Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [2007]: "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games,"Journal of Economic Theory, 132: 461-473
• Imitation and Evolution:  slides-pdf slides-doc Levine, D. K. and W. Pesendorfer [2007]: "Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation," Games and Economic Behavior, 58: 293-315

3. Reputation

• Perfect and Imperfect Information: slides-pdf slides-doc  Kreps, D. and R. Wilson [1982]: "Reputation and Imperfect Information,"Journal of Economic Theory, 50: 253-79, Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts [1982]: "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, 50: 443-60, Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1989]: "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, 57: 759-778, Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1992]: "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, 59: 561-580
• Long Run Players: Schmidt, K. [1991]: "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests," mimeo
• Bad Reputation:  slides-pdf slides-doc Ely, J. and J. Valimaki [2002]: "Bad Reputation," NAJ Economics, 4: 2, Ely, J., D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine [2008]: "When is Reputation Bad,"Games and Economic Behavior, 63: 498-526
• *Reputation is Who You Aren't: slides-pdf slides-doc  Mailath, G. J. and Samuelson, L. [2001], Who Wants a Good Reputation?. Review of Economic Studies, 68: 415–441.
• Relationships: slides-pdf slides-doc