Proseminar in Economic Theory

Economics 218 by David K. Levine (August 01, 2000)

[218CLASS.HTM]

The seminar discusses advanced topics and recent developments in game theory, information and uncertainty and general equilibrium theory. The instructor and seminar participants present recent papers published and unpublished in economic theory as well as their own research. Participants are expected to make a presentation. The topics vary depending on current interests in the profession. Beginning with Winter Quarter 1997, the format will be a "brown bag" bring your own lunch format, meeting at noon.

Forum for discussion:

This class has its own usenet newsgroup. Participants can use this for posting messages discussing current research either of their own or of others. The newsgroup is also used for scheduling talks.

Possible topics:

Learning in games. Evolutionary models. Repeated games. Stochastic games. Folk Theorems. Models of reputation. Refinements of Nash equilibrium. Optimization theory and bandits. Bargaining models. Mechanism design. Auctions. Monopoly power. Local vs. global interactions. Diffusion of information. Incomplete markets. Asset markets. Bankruptcy. Debt constraints. Models of informational asymmetry.

Papers and topics recently discussed:

Azariadis, C. and V. Galasso (1995): "Voting for Social Security."

Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (1992): "The Firm as a Communication Network."

Celentani, M. (1995): "Reputation with Observable Actions," Economic Theory.

Ellickson, B. and J. Penalva (1995): "Intertemporal Insurance."

Ellison, G. and D. Fudenberg (1993): "Rules of thumb for social learning," Journal of Political Economy.

Foster, D. and R. Vohra (1996): "Calibration and Correlated Equilibrium"

Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (1994): "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play"

Gale, D. (1993): "Dynamic Coordination Games."

Kalai, E. and E. Lehrer (1995) "Subjective games and equilibria," Econometrica.

Kandori, M., G. Mailath and R. Rob (1993): "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibrium in Games," Econometrica.

Kang, S. (1994): "Cooperation through Mutation and Learning in a Heterogeneous Population"

Kang. S. (1996): "Optimal Committee Size"

Kim, Y. (1993): "Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Games."

Lee, I. (1993): "On the Convergence of Informational Cascades," Journal of Economic Theory.

Levine, D. (1995), "Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game."

Marine-Rodriguez, G (1995).: "Counterfactuals and the concept of equilibrium in game theory."

Martinelli, C. (1993): "Reputation and Credit Terms in New Markets."

Perktold, J. (1994): "Information Aggregation in an Adverse Selection Model with Heterogeneously Informed Buyers."

Pesendorfer, W. (1993): "Endogenous Incomplete Markets."

Su, T. (1995): "Job Training in a Labor Market with Adverse Selection"

Weinschelbaum, F. (1996): " Corruption"