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Theres also the recent work of postlewaite's student at upenn (i forget the name...someone called obara I think: theres a link from postlewaites webpage.) [View full text and thread]
| 03/05/2001 12:37 PM by Pedro Dal Bó; prisoner dilemma's payoffs |
I don't think you can express the condition for tit-for-tat to be an equilibrium as a condition in a difference of two payoffs only since three payoffs are involved. The temptation payoff T, the reward payoff R and the sucker payoff S. [View full text and thread]
Hi! I understand now but I'm afraid my knowledge's not up to task :)
Keep your question here and I'm sure someone would help you with it as soon as they can. [View full text and thread]
| 03/03/2001 01:45 AM by Birol Baskan; problem is the following |
Thank you Brandon for your eager answer. Let me be more specific about what I am particularly interested. When you repeat the prisoner's dilemma infitinitely many times, there arise many Nash equilibrium strategy. One of them is Tit for Tat strategy. It is argued that Tit for tat is the nash eq. strategy to some one who is playing also Tit for tat. Nevertheless, it may not be so if you discount future payoffs. Consider the following strategy : you alternate between Cooperate and Defect every stage of the game against tit for tat player. Then, we have to determine two conditions to assure that tit for tat is Nash to someone who is playing tit for tat, either on discount rate or on the difference between payoffs (ui(D, C) - ui(C,C). If I do not want to determine a condition on discount rate, I have to do it for the difference between payoffs. What I am asking is whether there is any condition on the difference between payoffs. I hope that I am clear enough. [Manage messages]
I think I should get it right and more specific here....
When both players cooperate they are both rewarded at an equal, intermediate level (reward, R).
Now we want to create a chance to "cheat" so,
When only one player defects, [View full text and thread]
Hi! I'm not sure a "standard procedure" to go about assigning payoffs but I think one should be able to construct your own simple payoff matrix while keeping the following in mind:
No matter what the other player does, you'll be [View full text and thread]
| 03/02/2001 08:11 AM by Birol Baskan; conditions for the payoffs in prisoner's dilemma |
While assigning payoffs to strategies in prisoner's dilemma, what conditions should we impose on the payoffs? [View full text and thread]
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